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Poster Presentation 4
PARTY CONTROL AND THE TAXATION OF THE RICH

Leslie J. Ayers and Robert Leekley*, Department of Economics, IWU
In the United States, many people identify themselves as either Democrats or
Republicans. The two parties represent different ideologies that tend to
attract different constituencies. Democrats tend to favor more government
intervention to correct market failures, and to redistribute income in order to
reduce the inequality among the classes. Republicans tend to have more
faith in the capitalist system, and consequently prefer less government
intervention. If the two parties actually act on their different ideologies, then
the party in control should help explain policy outcomes. However, previous
research, focusing on the link between D emocratic party control and
increased levels of spending, has yielded mixed results.
This paper examines the link between Democratic party control and tax
policy. B ased on their ideological differences, Democrats should tend to
prefer a more progressive tax rate structure to redistribute income to the
lower classes, while the Republicans should tend to prefer a flatter tax rate
structure as an incentive to work. Hence, greater Democratic party control
should result in a more progressive tax rate structure.
Over the period of 1960 to 1993, a measure of the overall progressivity of the
tax rate system is developed by taking the difference between the tax rate of
the rich, defined as the top ten percent of taxpayers, and the overall tax rate
for each year. The independent variables include measures of the proportion
of D emocrats in the House of Representatives , the Senate, and the
President's party affiliation.
The average family income and the
unemployment rate are used as control variables to isolate the party impact.
Empirical results demonstrate that party affiliation of legislators assists in
explaining the progressivity of the tax rate structure ..

